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ABSTRACT: 
The UK has recently proposed to develop a set of criteria whereby the economic 
analysis of police force efficiency is to be made standard.  This follows a strategy of 
aiming for improvement through managerialism and Best Value Performance 
Indicators (BVPIs), similar to those implemented by US police forces after the 
Government Performance and Results Act 1993.  In this paper we attempt to put this 
recent development of efficiency targeting into a UK historical/evolutionary context 
and discuss the economic methodologies and techniques behind creating best practice 
police reference sets.  In addition, we present results from three techniques that have 
been advanced as tools to rank forces in the UK media and academic literature, and 
show how simple BVPI averaging can bias efficiency ranking of police forces. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
Political, economic and sociological research on the British police service can be 
divided into four areas in the literature.1  The first concerns the operation of the 
service and its relationship with the community, which can be traced back to Banton 
(1964) - see Reiner (1995), Morgan and Newburn (1997), and for a literature review 
Reiner (1989).  The second covers the historical development of the police force, 
from its beginnings in 19th Century London; see for example Rawlings (1995).  The 
third area considers the accountability and politics of policing and ranges from how 
police actions affect civil liberties to the changing nature of the organisational 
structure, both from a national and local perspective, see for example Borooah (2001). 
The final area of research that has emerged in the literature concerns the 
interaction of economic and sociological methodologies.  That is, this economic based 
research programme considers in detail the microeconomic consequences of the cost 
of policing and the resource allocation problems inherent in managing forces, see for 
example, early papers studying US city-wide police forces by Warlzer (1972) and 
Darrough and Heineke (1979), and more recently papers linking police resources to 
crime prevention, such as Benson and Rasmussen (1998).  Hence, the literature is 
concerned with the alternative production and input mix strategies that can be utilised 
in the reduction of crime incidences, and with the use of external ‘competition’, see, 
for example, Jones and Newburn (1995) for a review of the growing use of the private 
security sector in the UK as a substitute for public policing.  This methodology is also 
now associated with the local perspective of policing and how Local Police 
Authorities (LPA) draw up their plans in the assessment and operational stage, under 
the Police and Magistrates Act (1994) and subsequent legislation.2 
 Hence, in an economic conceptualisation of the modern police force it is 
possible to introduce a value based methodology, and this is evident in the 
                                                 
1  UK policing is split into 3 distinct jurisdictions, The Police Service of Northern Ireland, The Police 
forces of Scotland, and those stationed in England and Wales.  This paper is concerned with the latter 
group of which there are 43 forces, ranging from the largest in terms of personnel, The Metropolitan 
Police Force (London), to the smallest The City (The financial district of London). 
2  Local Police Authorities are county-wide and present local aims and targets for the police force to 
meet each year on top of national targets set down the Home Secretary, the minister in charge of 
overseeing policing in the UK. 
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reorganisation of the police service following the UK Thatcher/Major government 
reforms, especially after the Sheehy Report (1993).  Indeed, after the defeat of the 
Conservatives in the 1997 election, the new Labour government has also carried on 
this agenda of promoting efficiency in police forces.  For example, any new increases 
in resources given to the police service would be made on the premise that forces are 
able to show a 2% efficiency saving redirected back into front line operations. 
Two distinct views of the police service are apparent in the terminology of police 
functions as prevention/proactive or response/reactive based.  The latter can be 
attributed to the traditional Conservative description of what constitutes the major 
function of the police, as it is easy to quantify outcomes (for example, clear up rates) 
and therefore enable the creation of national performance tables, see Sullivan (1998) 
and Drake and Simper (2002b).  However, there has been a slight change in policy 
under new Labour in the sense that the former has been elevated to become an 
important attribute that governs the police service.  This prevention/proactive 
approach relates to securing what new Labour wants from the criminal justice system, 
and includes (Home Office): 
 
• Dealing with crime in its social context, tackling the causes as well as the effects; 
• Stopping crime before it starts, rather than dealing with its consequences; 
• Looking at problems holistically, with the interested parties working together to 
tackle identified problems in an effective way; 
• Addressing the problems that really concern people in their own communities; 
• Promoting a culture of balanced rights and responsibilities. 
 
The above five criteria imply that the efficiency of the police service, and how it is 
measured, will now include many unobservable factors, such as time patrolling the 
beat and crime prevention talks to the public.  Hence, the commitment to 
‘measurable’ and costed activity under the Conservative government has now been 
diminished.  Indeed, Loveday (1997), argues that costing analysis linked to policing 
by targets (such as increasing the clear-up rate) led to an erosion of the ‘convention of 
constabulary independence’, with the setting of these targets by the Local Police 
Authorities, under the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994.  Furthermore, not 
only is it difficult to analyse what constitutes appropriate police inputs and outputs, 
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but there are also local differences in economic (e.g., unemployment) and sociological 
(population of inner city) circumstances, such that the ‘soft’ performance measures 
utilised could lead to good management techniques being seen as a bad use of 
resources. 
 
 
THE MANAGERIALISM OF THE POLICE SERVICE. 
 
The concept of how to measure UK police performance has been moved to the 
forefront of the political agenda in the new Labour government’s second term.  
Indeed, the recent Public Service Productivity Panel (PSPP) (2000) report has stated 
that two quantitative techniques; the nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), and the parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), be utilised to enable 
efficiency rankings of forces.  It is an aim of this paper, therefore, to outline the 
techniques that have been proposed by the PSPP to assess police force efficiency.  
This outline will include an introduction to the managerialism, and hence best value 
implementation, within the service (see also Alexander (2000)), and a critique of 
rankings based on BVPIs.  
The analysis and estimation of efficiency in English and Welsh police forces, as 
proposed in the PSPP (2000) report, is based on a background of change within the 
service which includes; changes to the culture and core tasks (see Walker (1996)), and 
the introduction of business and economic techniques in costing and output 
measurement.  This latter reform of the police service has been linked to the 
efficiency drive instigated by the Conservative Government and prompted by the 
steady increase in crime since 1979, and the disproportionate increase in the fear of 
crime.3  Furthermore, as the crime rate appeared to rise with the economic cycle, 
contrary to many economic theories, commentators began to question police 
effectiveness.  Stephens (1994), for example, has identified the growing cost of, and 
increasing levels of crime, coupled with the declining public standing of the police 
force (associated with, miscarriages of justice such as the Guildford Four and the 
                                                 
3  The quest for efficiency in the Thatcher years began with a Home Office circular, 114/83 Manpower, 
Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service which gave way to the ‘civilisation’ of the force in 
the Home Office Circular 105/88, Civilian Staff in the Police Service. 
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Birmingham Six, and the miners’ strike in 1984/85, for example) as a major 
impetuous in the re-evaluation of police functions. 
These factors led to an inspection and review of the police, firstly under the 
Conservative government which included national agencies such as Her Majesties 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and the Audit Commission, and the 
introduction of various public charters including the Citizen’s Charter and the 
Victim’s Charter (for a discussion see Stephens (1994) and Sullivan (1998)).  The 
comprehensive review of the service resulted in several publications which promoted 
renewed interest in the efficiency of the police and included: Audit Commission 
(1990); Home Office (1993); Police Research Group (1993) and the Sheehy (1993) 
report which led to recommendations included in The Police and Magistrates’ Courts’ 
Act 1994.  One of the main recommendations of the Sheehy Report was to change the 
nature of police management from a public to a business-orientated organisation and 
to introduce efficiency targets co-ordinated with Local Police Authorities (known as 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)). 
 The introduction of managerialism in the police can therefore be traced back 
to the 1980’s, and the Economist (Sept 4th 1993) characterised this period as the 
‘privatisation’ of the service and the start of ‘civilianisation’ and ‘securitisation’.4  
The former meant hiring ordinary civilians to undertake tasks once considered within 
the police domain, such as lost property, garage repairs for police vehicles, etc.  
Securitisation of the police force led to increases in the numbers, and economic 
income, of the private security sector, which includes bodyguards and security 
consultants for offices and retail establishments.  For example, Jones and Newburn 
(1995) found, using British Telecom’s Business Database and the Labour Force 
Survey, that by the early 1990’s there were 7842 private security firms employing 
over 164,000 people in Britain.  That is, private security guards employed in Britain 
out-numbered policemen, and the sector had an estimated turnover of more than £2 
billion, a third of that of the Police Service.  
However, the analysis of police efficiency and the concept of Value For Money 
(VFM) in the UK public sector can be traced back even further to the Planning 
                                                 
4  That is, “managerialism referred to the belief that all state services do better when reconceived and 
restructured in terms of the business community’s values of efficiency and effectiveness” Sullivan 
(1998) (p. 307). 
 5
Programming and Budgeting (PPB) during the period 1969 to 1974.  This considered 
the outputs of the police service and its inputs, so as to enable the valuation of scarce 
resources (see, Southgate (1985)).  This initiative was also associated with the 
increased expansion of the service and, as Sinclair and Miller (1984) argued, the fact 
that police managers found the traditional “‘seat of the pants’ approach to 
management increasingly difficult.” (page. 4).  Hence, there are similarities with the 
need for change within the UK police service as was seen in the early 1990s in the 
US.  For example, the successful introduction of CompStat in New York, was hailed 
as a system which “at the core of it is the principle of accountability.  Holding the 
people who run the precincts accountable for achieving what the public wants them to 
do, which is reduce crime.” (page. 9, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani quoted in O’Connell 
(2001).  These techniques implemented in the US are a basis for the UK interest in 
police force efficiency and advancement of best management leading to Value for 
Money. 
The early UK initiative, however, was found to be unworkable due to a lack of 
systems in place enabling the easy interpretation of inputs and outputs; a main factor 
of CompStat was collection, for example, of daily crime data allowing managers the 
ability to aid efficient resource allocation.  It was not until a reinterpretation of 
policing activity under the Conservative government’s 1983 Home Office Circular 
114, that efficiency of the service was scrutinised.  In an approach designed to make 
forces explicitly state their aims and use of resources, the Home Office circular had 
four criteria, of which the fist, as Burrows (1989) argues, was deemed the most 
important.  That is, police expenditure “increases will only be given to forces whose 
resources are directed in accordance with ‘properly determined objectives and 
priorities.” (page. 22).5 
 Since being elected in 1997, the new Labour government has carried on this 
agenda of promoting efficiency in the police force (see the Home Office Inspectorate 
of Constabulary (HMIC) (1998) report “What Price Policing”).  The report reiterated 
                                                 
5  The process of the police rationalisation can also be seen after the Conservative Government’s drive 
to efficiency and the concept of value for money in all public services.  For example, the Home Office 
policy in the evaluation report, “Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks” published in 1995, by the 
then Home Secretary Michael Howard, stated that the report was “designed to help police managers 
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the previous Conservative government’s efficiency drive in the police service with the 
HMIC arguing that, “police managers need to work harder to ensure that VFM is 
achieved, for competitive pressure has to be created internally.  The costing of activity 
with subsequent measurement and comparison of performance provide the means by 
which such encouragement is given” (para. 10). 
 In addition, the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) set by the Home Secretary 
each year, were refocused in 1998/99 to include; youth offending; local partnerships 
to enable a reduction in crime; and reducing drug related crime, which came about as 
a result of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  The KPIs therefore need to be taken into 
account when assessing BVPIs as the former take priority in the aim to ensure the 
efficient allocation of police resources.  Since 1999 these KPIs have been updated in 
response to the Macpherson Report on the death of Stephen Lawrence.  The new 
updated KPIs implemented after June 2000 included the additional aim to increase the 
‘trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities’ (Report of 
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary 1999/2000).  Based on these KPIs, the 
target expressed in the PSPP (2000) report is to ensure differentiation between forces, 
such that “top performers should get a tangible reward,” and hence be given 
“preferential access to discretionary funding mechanisms, such as the Crime Fighting 
Fund.  This type of approach would also ensure that the extra funding available would 
be going to those forces that have the track record to show that they could do the most 
with it.” (page. 39). 
 
 
THE MEASUREMENT OF EFFICIENCY. 
 
 The assessment of English and Welsh policing activity, as discussed above, 
can be traced back over 30 years.  However, the methodology underlying the current 
efficiency measurement programme can be traced back to the Home Office Report 
“Measures of Police Effectiveness and Efficiency”, Sinclair and Miller (1984).  In this 
report the authors conducted interviews with senior policemen to gauge an 
understanding of the complexities of measuring both inputs and outputs, as required 
                                                                                                                                            
cope with the rising demand by considering if there are tasks which the police no longer need to carry 
out, or where their involvement can be reduced or streamlined.” 
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in any evaluative technique designed to enable improvement in the efficiency of the 
service.  Recent publications have re-assessed the economic evaluation of policing 
tasks, for example, Stockdale et al (1999) in a Police and Reducing Crime Unit report, 
“Applying Economic Evaluation to Policing Activity”.  The latter report states that, 
“there is a growing need for the police to make resource allocation decisions 
transparent, to evaluate outputs and outcomes, and to demonstrate that resources are 
being used to generate the best returns.”  That is, “economic evaluation involves the 
costing of inputs and valuing of outputs and outcomes, with particular emphasis on 
assigning monetary measurements wherever possible.” (page. v). 
This report states that when measuring police efficiency under a 
proactive/preventive methodology, three techniques can be utilised: performance; cost 
effectiveness analysis; and cost benefit analysis.  In consideration of previous studies, 
they state that, “for proactive policing, economic evaluation is currently only 
practicable in the context of specific initiatives, the application was not so easily 
applied to functional changes or to changes in ethos.” (page viii).  Indeed, Stockdale 
et al (1999) state that there has been “greater emphasis on proactive policing.  Forces 
have been urged to adopt intelligence-led policing and many have responded by 
introducing crime desks and crime management units, as well as undertaking specific 
initiatives.” (page. 2).  In this context, “proactivity refers to the strategic deployment 
of resources in order to target ‘criminally active’ individuals, so as to obtain evidence 
for a successful prosecution.  Such strategic action is intelligence-driven, with 
intelligence informing decisions about resource allocation to implement specific 
proactive operations and to support action in the broader arena of crime reduction.” 
(page. 5). 
 However, the PSPP (2000) report “Improving Police Performance”, although 
noting the importance of proactive/preventive policing, proposed that any model 
should take into account all factors of policing.  That is, “the selected outcome 
measures capture the essence of police outcomes and thus, implicitly or explicitly, the 
many dimensions to policing…  The focus of the outcome measures should be on 
what the police are being expected to achieve for the money they have.  This is 
different from trying to model everything that forces do on a day-to-day basis.” (page. 
16).  Hence, an efficiency model should have its outputs/outcomes based on a set of 
BVPIs from both the proactive/preventive and response/reactive methodologies, see 
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Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions., (1999) for a list of 
BVPIs. 
 A further implication of the report is that a modelling strategy that can allow 
for the joint interaction between the input and output set should be developed.  
Therefore, standard operations management input-output based techniques, to enable 
the measurement of police performance and optimal resource allocation decisions (see 
Correa and Wakefield (1996)) will be unlikely to discriminate adequately among 
forces.  The report states that as this interaction and ‘complete’ modelling strategy 
using a set of input and output/outcome variables is important, economic techniques 
such as production and cost function estimation should be utilised.  Hence, it was 
argued that multi-input/multi-output non-parametric techniques, such as Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and parametric techniques, such as the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) be used in tandem thereby allowing a broader set of 
variables to be used in the estimation analysis.6 
 
 
BVPI, DEA AND SFA MEASUREMENT ANALYSIS. 
 
As stated before, the PSPP (2000) report has advocated the use of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) as this allows an interaction 
between inputs and outputs in the policing function, thereby bypassing any of the 
failings in the initial 1960-1970s performance measurement programme.  However, a 
recent analysis of policing by The Observer7 newspaper (2nd December 2001) 
presented a ranking of police force efficiency based on the simple ordered average of 
police BVPI rankings8.  The outputs utilised in these rankings were: % of recorded 
crimes detected; number of complaints per 1000 officers; % 999 calls answered 
within target time; average number of sickness days per officer; and % immediate 
response incidents where target time is met.  Table 1 presents rankings based on The 
Observer’s data but excluding (due to the subsequent DEA and SFA estimation in this 
                                                 
6  Indeed, these techniques can be used, not only to access police forces, but also at precinct/basic 
command level, for a US DEA example see Sun (2002). 
7  The Observer is a quality Sunday UK broadsheet national newspaper. 
8  Indeed the paper went further by headlining the results as “Revealed: the Country’s Worst Police.”  
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paper) two forces: the City and the Sussex (due to missing data).  The rankings are 
therefore slightly different to those published in The Observer. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
This ranking of police forces shows that the Suffolk is the best performing police 
force, while Staffordshire is the worst, but it is interesting to note that the two largest 
forces, the Greater Manchester and the Metropolitan are in the bottom 5.  In terms of 
actual efficiency performance, these differences can be seen, for example, in detection 
figures, where Dyfed-Powys and Gwent have an impressive detection rate of 63% and 
57% respectively, and Nottingham and the Metropolitan have rates equal to 20% and 
15% respectively.  Finally, in terms of sickness days, Humberside has 8.6 days lost 
per officer and Gwent and South Wales have 15.40 and 16.10 days off per officer 
respectively.  These estimates show that there are wide variations in the performance 
of forces using these Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs).9 
The ranking technique utilised by The Observer assumes that each BVPI is 
given equal weight.  That is each force should consider, for example, that increasing 
the ‘detection rate of crime’ is equal in terms of resource allocation to reducing 
‘number of days off sick’.  As the primary aim of policing is to prevent crime and, 
where crime is committed to ensure that the perpetuator is caught, this equal ranking 
of weights of BVPIs could create severe re-directions of resources as forces reallocate 
funds to ensure a higher ranking in future tables.  For example, increasing ‘detection 
rates’ is considerably more expensive in terms of costs than increasing the ‘% 999 
calls answered within target time’.  As stated above, these simplistic rankings led the 
PSPP (2000) report to advocate the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and the parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).  
 The estimation of the two modelling techniques (DEA and SFA), implies that 
there can be posited a production or cost function relation to policing activity.  In the 
literature there have been two methodologies that have been proposed in respect of 
                                                 
9  There is an argument, of course, that using some other BVPIs might change the ranking of forces, or 
as Drake and Simper (2002b) discuss there may be bias, differences, or problems, in the actual 
collection of the BVPIs across forces.  This paper does not consider these factors as we are primarily 
concerned with any rank bias caused by utilising different efficiency measurement techniques. 
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the estimation of a police force cost or production function.  The first follows 
Darrough and Heineke (1979) (see also Gyimah-Brempong (1987)), where it is 
assumed that a police force chooses the level and mix of inputs to maximise the net 
value of police output.  The second methodology is related to the former model in that 
we can estimate its dual, a cost function for a multi-input/multi-output police force 
(see Carrington et al (1997), and Drake and Simper (2002a) and (2002c)).10 
Thus, in both modelling frameworks (and underlying the PSPP (2000) report), 
we assume that the police function can be neatly classified within the neo-classical 
economic paradigm.  In Carrington et al (1997) and Drake and Simper ((2000) and 
(2002c)), the model assumes that the aim of the police is to minimise their input set 
while keeping output constant, that is, through the Value For Money (VFM) 
argument, they aim for cost minimisation.  The latter statement has important 
implications for all police forces when it comes to analysing efficiency.  For example, 
an aim of BVPI analysis is to ensure forces reduce the marginal cost of catching and 
arresting criminals in addition to other police functions.  In this context, both the 
response/reactive and proactive/preventive jobs of policing must be undertaken with 
the aim of cost minimisation within a differing set of input costs ensuring a 
subsequent increase in outputs/outcomes.  If this is not undertaken effectively, 
through the optimal allocation of resources to output/outcomes, an examined force 
using either DEA or SFA is unlikely to be found efficient relative to its peers. 
The first technique considered by the PSPP (2000) report is concerned with 
the objective of constructing an efficient production frontier for the police service.  
The term Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was coined by Charnes et al (1978) and 
is a linear programming technique for constructing extremal piecewise frontiers as 
originally developed by Farrell (1957).  DEA is a leading analytical technique for 
measuring relative efficiency and has been widely used by both academics and 
practitioners in evaluating the efficiency of decision making units (DMUs) within an 
organisation or industry in terms of converting resources/inputs into outputs. 
                                                 
10  The problems associated with the current empirical methods used by the Home Office in the 
allocation of funds have been discussed by Carr-Hill (2000).  This paper considers models which are 
supposed to overcome the difficulties mentioned by Carr-Hill (2000) by estimating economic models 
of cost and production functions. 
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The technique was originally developed in order to develop performance 
measures in non-profit making organisations where the usual monetary criteria of 
return on assets/capital, etc, were not appropriate, for policing, see Carrington et al 
(1997), Drake and Simper (2000 and 2002a), Nyhan and Martin (1999) and Sun 
(2002).  The constructed relative efficiency frontiers are non-statistical or 
nonparametric in the sense that they are constructed through the envelopment of the 
decision making units (DMUs), with the "best practice" DMUs forming the non-
parametric frontier.  Hence, a particular attraction of DEA is that no knowledge is 
necessary of the underlying production or cost function.  All that is required is that 
some correspondence exists between inputs and outputs/outcomes across the DMU. 
For each DMU in turn, using x and y, to represent its particular observed 
inputs and outputs, pure technical efficiency is calculated by solving the problem of 
finding the lowest multiplicative factor, θ, which must be applied to the firm’s use of 
inputs, x, to ensure it is still a member of the input requirements set or reference 
technology.  That is, choose 
 
{θ,λ} to:  min θ such that:  θx ≥ λ’X 
   y ≤ λ’Y 
  λi ≥ 0, Σλi = 1, i = 1,..., n      (1) 
 
Hence, in (1) we assume a variable returns to scale reference technology and 
concentrate exclusively on technical efficiency, i.e., the efficiency of translating 
inputs into outputs at the given scale of production.11   
 An alternative approach to the non-parametric frontier measurement 
techniques (DEA) is that of stochastic frontier models suggested by Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt (1977). These models typically involve the specification of a stochastic 
production or cost frontier, in which a cost function, for example, can be expressed 
more formally as follows: 
 
  ( ) ititit w,yClnCln ε+=        (2) 
                                                 
11  Due to the difficulties in accurately measuring all input prices in public sector services such as the 
police force, this paper does not consider allocative efficiency. 
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   iitit vlnuln +=ε         (3) 0vi ≥
 
Where lnC represents the natural logarithm of total costs, y is a vector of 
outputs/outcomes, w is a vector of input prices and itε  is a composed error term that 
reflects both statistical noise and the X-inefficiency (see below) of the police forces in 
the sample.  The component u  is assumed to be symmetrically distributed around a 
zero mean but  is assumed to be non-negative (non-positive in the case of a 
stochastic production frontier).  Hence,  represents the deviations above the 
minimum cost frontier (X-inefficiency) associated with either technical inefficiency 
(excessive use of inputs in the production of outputs/outcomes) or allocative 
inefficiency (the failure to utilise the cost minimising input bundle given input prices 
and the level of outputs/outcomes).  However, to obtain inefficiency scores, it is 
necessary to make assumptions concerning the distribution of the X-efficiency error 
term, , such as the half normal or truncated normal.  Indeed, estimation utilising 
other distributions, such as the gamma distribution (see Greene (1993)), could lead to 
different efficiency ranking and scores.  Although Berger (1993) argues that if a panel 
data series is utilised (where data is available over a number of years), an approach 
can be adopted in which it is not necessary to specify an exact distribution for the 
inefficiency term.
it
iv
iv
iv
12 
 As alluded to previously, a particular advantage of non-parametric techniques 
such as DEA, relative to statistical or parametric techniques such as stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA), is that the latter must assume a particular functional form which 
characterises the relevant economic production function or cost function (traditionally 
                                                 
12   In this paper we estimate a Translog cost function relating the single one input cost (C) to the 
number of BVPIs yi, this specification follows directly the preferred model presented by the Home 
Office commissioned Demonstration Project (2001).  The functional form is given by the following 
equation, where ln is the natural logarithm: 
itm n nm2
1
i iitit
ylnylnylnconstantCln ε+σ+α+= ∑ ∑∑  
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a Translog cost function).13  Hence, any resultant efficiency scores will be partially 
dependent on how accurately the chosen functional form represents the true 
production relationship (i.e., the relationship between inputs/resources and 
outputs/outcomes).  As DEA is non-parametric and envelops the input/output data of 
the DMUs under consideration, the derived efficiency results do not suffer from this 
problem of functional form dependency. 
An aim of the PSPP (2000) report is to use DEA and SFA to aid efficiency 
rankings, i.e., by police rank quartiles, for example.  That is, "differentiated efficiency 
targets - to improve the level of police outcomes for the funding available - should be 
introduced thereafter based on the banding system." (page. 7).  However, in respect of 
the disadvantages of DEA, it must be remembered that DEA can produce a number of 
jointly efficient units, i.e., all ranked at 100.  In these cases, no further relative 
efficiency discrimination is possible across these units in the basic DEA analysis.  
Hence, this creates a problem in respect of banding because we might find that a large 
number of forces are placed in the top band. 
A further potential criticism, given the non-parametric nature of the DEA 
approach, is that any deviations from the efficient frontier are interpreted as 
inefficiencies as a consequence of the absence of a random error term.  Hence, there is 
the possibility that DEA actually overstates inefficiency levels by failing to allow for 
“bad luck”, measurement error, etc.  DEA efficiency measurements can also be 
sensitive to outliers.  This possibility arises from the fact that the efficient frontier is 
itself derived from the actual input/output configurations of the sample firms/units.  
Hence, the level of efficiency may be largely self determined in the case of outliers as 
there may be no similar units in the relevant input/output region from which to form 
the efficient production frontier.  It is these relative pros and cons of the two 
techniques which prompted the PSPP (2000) report to advocate the joint use of both 
DEA and SFA. 
 
 
DEA AND SFA RESULTS AND A COMPARISON WITH BVPI RANKINGS. 
                                                 
13 Indeed, even though Darrough and Heineke (1979) and Drake and Simper (2002a) begin with 
different premises for their methodology, they both utilise the Translog cost function to estimate their 
chosen function of police activity. 
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 The DEA and SFA models were estimated over the sample period 1998/1999 and 
1999/2000 using the measure of input-cost, ‘expenditure per head of population per 
force’.  The outputs were the 5 BVPIs presented in The Observer and discussed 
above, suitably transformed such that they are all ‘more is better’ variables.  An input 
orientated DEA specification was chosen as this is invariant to output variable 
transformations.  This specification, although restrictive in terms of having a single 
input-cost, follows directly the preferred model of the Home Office commissioned 
Demonstration Project (2001), which was the first official report estimating UK police 
force efficiency.  Furthermore, unlike the Demonstration Project, this analysis utilises 
the same input/cost and output variables for both the DEA and SFA specifications.  In 
addition, as there are only 41 police forces in our sample, a Translog specification 
with five outputs causes severe degrees of freedom problems in estimation if input 
prices were to be included as regressors, as would be required in a full cost function 
estimation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
The results for the DEA and SFA models are presented in Table 2 in terms of the 
mean efficiency scores over the two years of the data sample.  It is clear from these 
results that there is a wide range of efficiency levels across the English and Welsh 
police forces.  With respect to the DEA scores, these range from 45.55 to 100, with 
four forces (Durham, Hampshire, Suffolk, and Gwent) consistently on the efficiency 
frontier and hence recording a mean score of 100.  In contrast, the SFA efficiency 
scores range from 99.28 for the Dyfed-Powys to 69.86 for the Merseyside.  It is 
interesting to note that some of the largest forces which record very low DEA 
efficiency scores actually perform much better according to SFA analysis.  For 
example, the Metropolitan Police record a DEA score of 45.55 and are ranked 41, but 
exhibit an SFA score of 97.34 and are ranked 9th.  Similarly, the Greater Manchester 
force have a DEA score of 68.64 (rank 39) but exhibit an SFA score of 90.33 (rank 
33). 
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 The relationship between the DEA and the SFA efficiency scores is illustrated 
very clearly in Figure 1.  This shows that, in general, there is a strong correlation 
between the two sets of efficiency scores.  Indeed, the Spearmans rank correlation is 
equal to 0.559 (significant at the 1% critical level).  It is also clear from Figure 1, 
however, that there are some clear outliers, and this is mostly obvious in respect of the 
Metropolitan Police Force.  It is for this reason, together with the other well known 
pros and cons of non-parametric versus parametric efficiency measurement 
techniques, that the PSPP (2000) report advocated that the results obtained from DEA 
should be contrasted with a comparable parametric approach (the stochastic cost 
frontier).  The latter model is less prone to the outlier problem and does not tend to 
produce units which are jointly 100% efficient.  Hence, SFA can produce more 
discrimination across the most efficient units than DEA.  Furthermore, given that both 
DEA and SFA have different sets of pros and cons, it follows that the fairest and most 
accurate reflection of police force relative efficiency will be produced when the non-
parametric and parametric results are combined (see Drake and Simper (2002c)). 
The problem of outliers is linked in part to scale economies/efficiency in 
policing, and hence to force size.  Whereas, scale inefficiency relates to the failure to 
operate at constant returns to scale (i.e., the presence of either increasing or 
decreasing returns to scale), technical inefficiency relates to inefficiency in respect of 
translating inputs (resources) into outputs/outcomes.  Drake and Simper (2000 and 
2002a) confirmed that significant scale effects exist in respect of English and Welsh 
police forces.  In consideration of US studies, Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong 
(1988) find constant returns to scale for the Michigan police force, while Gyimah-
Brempong (1987) finds decreasing returns to scale in Florida police forces.  Finally, 
Carrington et al (1997), who modelled 163 police patrol districts of the New South 
Wales police force, found that there were; 55 increasing, 29 constant, and 79 
decreasing returns to scale forces in their sample.  Hence, if relative police force 
efficiencies were to be assessed on the assumption of constant returns to scale, both 
small and large police forces would be disadvantaged by virtue of their high levels of 
scale efficiency.  Hence, it might be argued that the focus should be on technical 
efficiency since scale efficiency is largely outside the control of individual police 
forces. 
 It follows from this that the DEA analysis should be conducted using the 
variable returns to scale (VRS) model, and that the cost function specified in the SFA 
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analysis should be sufficiently flexible to allow for variable returns to scale.  It should 
be noted in this context, therefore, that both the linear and Cobb-Douglas models, 
which could be used in the SFA analysis, are inappropriate as neither allows for 
variable returns to scale in policing.  In addition, in order for the DEA and SFA 
results to be contrasted (and possibly combined) in any meaningful way, it is essential 
that both models are estimated using the same set of variables.14  If this is not the 
case, it will be impossible to ascertain whether any efficiency variations are due to 
differences inherent in the techniques, or due to the different set of variables 
specified.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
It is an aim of this paper to show that the simple averaging of BVPIs can lead 
to a bias in efficiency rankings and also have a fundamental effect on police force 
efficiency banding.  As discussed earlier, the latter is to be linked to special grants and 
awards to the ‘best’ police forces in England and Wales.  Table 3 presents, firstly the 
combined DEA/SFA rank scores (this methodology follows Drake and Simper 
(2002c)) and compares them with the ranks produced by The Observer methodology.  
It is clear from this Table that there is considerable disparity between the two sets of 
rankings.  The most interesting finding, is that only 2 of the bottom 5 of The Observer 
ranked forces are in the bottom 5 group of the combined DEA/SFA scores.  Indeed, 
the Thames Valley force was ranked 39th by The Observer, but according to the more 
robust DEA/SFA methodologies, it is actually placed in the top 5 most efficient 
forces.  A large divergence between results can also be seen in Dorset (28th to 7th), 
Cambridgeshire (32nd to 9th), and West Mercia (19th to 4th).  At the other end of the 
spectrum, The Observer ranked Gloucestershire 3rd, when in fact it is in the bottom 
third of efficient forces using DEA/SFA, similarly Northumbria was ranked 6th, when 
under the DEA/SFA approach it is ranked 34th).   
                                                 
14  The difficulties of choosing inputs and outputs in the modelling techniques advocated in PSPP 
(2000) will be discussed in a future paper. 
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Although the rank correlation of 0.335 between The Observer and combined 
DEA/SFA rankings is positive and statistically significant (at the 5% critical level), 
the rank correlation is much weaker that that between the DEA and SFA (0.559).  
This is illustrated very clearly in the contrast between Figures 1 and 2.  In the former, 
notwithstanding the presence of some outliers, there is a clear positive correlation 
between the DEA and SFA ranks.  In contrast, in Figure 2, there is no clear 
discernible relationship between The Observer and the DEA/SFA ranks. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The recent moves towards the development of robust measures of relative police force 
efficiency, and of associated police force efficiency rankings/bandings, is a logical 
development of the trend towards managerialism in policing and the drive for value 
for money evident since the 1980s.  The nonparametric DEA and parametric SFA 
techniques both have sound academic foundations and have been widely used in 
efficiency studies in the public and private sectors.  It is for this reason that their use 
was advocated by the PSPP (2000) report in respect of assessing the relative 
efficiency of English and Welsh police forces.  This paper endorses this view and 
provides clear evidence that the use of more simplistic analysis based on BVPIs can 
produce highly misleading and biased rankings.  In contrast, the DEA and SFA results 
exhibited a relatively high degree of positive correlation, which acts as a form of 
cross-validation of the two techniques.  The presence of disparities between the DEA 
and SFA efficiency scores, however, confirms that these techniques should be used 
jointly as the exclusive reliance on one of the techniques could unfairly penalise some 
forces. 
As a final caveat, however, PSPP (2000) recognises that there are limitations 
to both efficiency measurement techniques (DEA and SFA) and that "the techniques 
cannot be used mechanistically or interpreted simplistically.  If they are, the wrong 
conclusions will be drawn.  Careful analysis and judgement must be applied to the 
results." (page. 5).  This is particularly important in the context of external factors 
which may impact on police force efficiency, but which are outside the control of 
individual forces.  A possible solution to the problem, however, is to use DEA and 
 18
SFA to produce police force efficiency bandings, and then to consult with forces to 
establish whether these results are due to external factors which have not been taken 
into account.  If this is the case, adjustments can be made and further analysis 
undertaken. 
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 Table 1. 
The Observer Efficiency Rankings of Police Forces. 
Police Force Grant (st m) Police Force Grant (m) 
1. Suffolk 70.9 22. South Yorkshire 177.3 
2. Durham 83.9 22. Merseyside 242.3 
3. Gloucestershire 63.5 24. Bedfordshire 64.1 
4. Dyfed-Powys 53.1 25. Norfolk 86.5 
5. Northamptonshire 67.7 26. North Yorkshire 79.7 
6. Northumbria 218.4 27. Nottinghamshire 130.0 
6. Kent 191.2 28. Essex 174.8 
8. Derbyshire 105.5 28. Dorset 72.4 
9. Humberside 116.9 30. Surrey 112.9 
10. Leicestershire 105.6 31. South Wales 167.7 
11. Hampshire 202.7 32. Cambridgeshire 77.2 
12. North Wales 77.5 33. Cleveland 84.7 
13. Cumbria 62.2 34. Avon and Somerset 173.8 
13. Lancashire 185.3 35. Lincolnshire 65.4 
15. Wiltshire 66.7 35. Cheshire 111.9 
16. Gwent 71.9 37. Hertfordshire 117.3 
17. West Midlands 392.8 38. Metropolitan Police 1731.5 
18. West Yorkshire 297.1 39. Thames Valley 231.8 
19. West Mercia 117.2 40. Greater Manchester 386.1 
20. Devon and 
Cornwall 
179.0 41. Staffordshire 116.8 
21. Warwickshire 54.4 Total 7046.0 
The police grant is takes into account a wide range of factors, including; geographical area, 
population size, etc., hence, it is relatively good proxy for police size.  (Source Home Office). 
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 Table 2. 
Police Force Pure Technical Efficiency (DEA), 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Stochastic 
Distance Function Analysis (SDFA) Results 
POLICE FORCE DEA SFA 
Avon and Somerset 87.82  (29) 96.11  (14) 
Bedfordshire 93.21  (20) 96.01  (16) 
Cambridgeshire 97.80  (10) 95.81  (17) 
Cheshire 90.96  (24) 94.30  (21) 
Cleveland 70.28  (38) 74.10  (40) 
Cumbria 88.97  (27) 77.68  (38) 
Derbyshire 97.51  (12) 91.94  (29) 
Devon and Cornwall 92.52  (23) 96.98  (11) 
Dorset 97.99  (9) 98.25  (4) 
Durham 100     (1) 97.72  (5) 
Essex 95.53  (16) 97.47  (7) 
Gloucestershire 93.03  (21) 87.58  (35) 
Hampshire 100     (1) 97.52  (6) 
Hertfordshire 88.48  (28) 95.77  (18) 
Humberside 99.06  (6) 95.40  (19) 
Kent 95.35  (18) 97.01  (10) 
Lancashire 85.97  (30) 90.36  (32) 
Leicestershire 98.15  (7) 93.97  (23) 
Lincolnshire 93.83  (19) 91.54  (31) 
Norfolk 92.87  (22) 92.30  (28) 
Northamptonshire 99.23  (5) 94.05  (22) 
North Yorkshire 96.00  (15) 96.46  (12) 
Nottinghamshire 82.02  (34) 93.45  (25) 
Staffordshire 85.60  (31) 96.08  (15) 
Suffolk 100     (1) 97.40  (8) 
Surrey 90.25  (26) 95.04  (20) 
Thames Valley 97.77  (11) 99.18  (2) 
Warwickshire 96.82  (14) 96.29  (13) 
West Mercia 98.14  (8) 98.84  (3) 
Wiltshire 95.40  (17) 91.78  (30) 
Dyfed – Powys 97.46  (13) 99.28  (1) 
Gwent 100     (1) 93.32  (26) 
North Wales 84.36  (32) 84.55  (36) 
South Wales 75.26  (37) 87.70  (34) 
Greater Manchester 68.64  (39) 90.33  (33) 
Merseyside 58.66  (40) 69.86  (41) 
Northumbria 90.84  (25) 77.15  (39) 
South Yorkshire 80.23  (36) 80.40  (37) 
West Midlands 83.96  (33) 93.49  (24) 
West Yorkshire 81.33  (35) 92.55  (27) 
Metropolitan Police 45.55  (41) 97.34  (9) 
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 The Observer (OBS) and DEA/SFA C
of P
Police Force OBS COE
Suffolk 1
Durham 2
Gloucestershire 3 2
Dyfed-Powys 4
Northamptonshire 5 1
Northumbria 6 3
Kent 6 1
Derbyshire 8 1
Humberside 9
Leicestershire 10 1
Hampshire 11
North Wales 12 3
Cumbria 13 3
Lancashire 13 3
Wiltshire 15 2
Gwent 16 1
West Midlands 17 2
West Yorkshire 18 3
West Mercia 19
Devon and Cornwall 20 1
Warwickshire 21 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 
ombined Overall Efficiency (COE) Rankings 
olice Forces. 
 Police Force OBS COE 
3 South Yorkshire 22 37
1 Merseyside 22 41
8 Bedfordshire 24 19
6 Norfolk 25 24
1 North Yorkshire 26 14
4 Nottinghamshire 27 31
5 Essex 28 13
8 Dorset 28 7
8 Surrey 30 22
6 South Wales 31 36
2 Cambridgeshire 32 9
3 Cleveland 33 39
5 Avon and Somerset 34 26
0 Lincolnshire 35 21
0 Cheshire 35 23
0 Hertfordshire 37 25
9 Metropolitan Police 38 40
2 Thames Valley 39 5
4 Greater Manchester 40 38
7 Staffordshire 41 27
2 Correlation  0.34526
 
Figure 1 
DEA and SFA Scatter plot of Efficiency Scores 
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 Figure 2 
Police Force Efficiency Performance Correlation Plot between The Observer and 
Combined Efficiency Ranks 
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